February, 193i.

ANNOUNCEMENT
The REViEW takes pleasure in announcing the election of the following
members of the Second Year Class. To the Editorial Board: Alexander F.
Barbieri, Walter Beachboard, James W. Bertolet, K. Wilde Blackburn, John C.
Bruton, Jr., Bernard F. Cataldo, Harold C. Cohen, Saul Finestone, B. Friedman,
James E. Gallagher, Jr., Charles R. Hindley, Israel Packel, Herbert N. Shenkin,
Herbert J. Slaughter, David J. Speck. To the Business Board: Samuel A.
Blank, Edward I. Harburg, Bernard A. Master, Harold R. Prowell.

NOTES
CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF PREFERRED AND COMMON SHAREHOLDERS WITH RESPECT TO CORPORATE "PROFIT'S"-In the recent

case of Murphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Company1 the Supreme
Court of Missouri decided that preferred shares created under articles of association which provided that "said preferred shares shall
be entitled to a dividend of 6 per cent. per annum out of the net
yearly income earned in any one current year before any dividend
shall be made and paid on the common shares of said corporation,
and which said preferred shares shall, upon distribution of the assets
of the corporation, be first paid in full before any of said assets
are applied to any of the common shares, ..
.", did not entitle the
holders thereof (I) to participate equally with the holders of the
unpreferred shares in the distribution of surplus assets upon dissolution, or (2) to receive out of such surplus assets an amount equal to
the preferred dividends not earned in two preceeding years; in short,
the court held that the preferred shares were non-participating and
non-cumulative.
This decision involves the following important problem, to which
the courts of this country have as yet given little consideration: what
allocation is to be made of corporate "profits" 2 by a corporation
among several different classes of shareholders, either while the corporation is a "going concern" or is in the process of liquidation. That
such "profits" belong to the shareholders, whether they be distributed
as dividends or remain as surplus assets after the company has
ceased to be a "going concern", is uncontraverted; the question is,
to what class of shareholders do the "profits" belong.
There are two situations in which this problem may arise: first,
when the company is a "going concern" and as a result of either an
accumulation of undivided yearly net earnings or an increase in the
value of properties owned by it, has a surplus which it wishes to dis131 S. W. (2d) 72 (Mo. ig3o).
'By the term "profits" here is meant both surplus of a going concern and
surplus assets of a liquidating company.
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tribute in the form of dividends; second, when the company winds
up its affairs and, after paying all its obligations to creditors, and setting aside a sum equal to the "capital" contribution of its shareholders, has a surplus to distribute among the shareholders.
Distribution of Dividends by a Going Concern
The relation existing between the shareholders and the corporation, and between the shareholders inter se is established by judicial interpretation of the provisions of the applicable statutes, the
articles of association, the by-laws and share certificates? In general,
these four sources of judicial interpretation constitute a hierarchy in
the order named, i. e. in case of conflict the applicable statutes are
of most importance and the share certificate of least. But it should
be noted that there are practically no statutory provisions bearing
upon the problem with which this note is concerned.
With respect to the allocation of dividends among shareholders,
shares may be of four classes: i. preferred and limited; 2. preferred
and unlimited; 3. unpreferred and limited; 4. unpreferred and unlimited. 4 Certain principles are clear; the limited shares, whether
preferred or unpreferred, cannot participate in profits pan passu
with the unlimited shares 5 beyond the limitation provided. Likewise, unlimited shares are entitled to participate rateably in any distribution of profits beyond a stated preference and, with respect to
such excess distribution, it is immaterial whether they be preferred
'See Continental Ins. Co. v. Minneapolis, etc. Ry., 290 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 8th,

1923), certiorari denied, 263 U. S. 703, 44 Sup. Ct. 33 (1923) ; Stone v. United
States Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, III At]. 536 (1920); Thomas v. Laconia
Car Co., 251 Mass. 529, 146 N. E. 775 (1925).

' i. e. x. non-participating preferred; 2. participating preferred; 3. non-participating unpreferred; 4. participating unpreferred or "common". This same
classification may be made with respect to capital distributions depending upon
whether the shares are preferred or unpreferred, limited or unlimited, as to
repayment of capital contribution on dissolution. Thus by dealing with each

class in respect to dividends in combination with any one of the four as to
capital contribution it is possible to have at least sixteen different kinds of shares
for the purpose of allocaton of "profits". See Frey, Shareholders Pre-emptive

Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 563, 566. However, in this note, the four
divisions as to dividends, and the four divisions as to assets on dissolution are
considered separately. Shares which are partly participating beyond a preferential amount are not dealt with herein.
'In Scott v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 93 Md., 475, 49 Atl. 32 (IgoI),
shares were created under a "plan and agreement" which provided that preferred shares were to receive a non-cumulative preference dividend not exceeding four per cent. per annum. The court held that the words "not exceeding"
would be mere surplusage if the preferred shares were allowed to participate
further than four per cent. In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 212 N. Y. 36o, io6 N. E. 92 (94), it was held that
preferred shareholders could not participate in surplus profits further than four
per cent. under articles of association which, after stating the preference, continued "and the preferred stock is entitled to no other or further share of the
profits."
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or unpreferred. Thus the question narrows down to this: when, if
ever, are shares limited other than in cases where a limitation is specifically expressed in the corporate instruments? 7
In respect to unpreferred shares there is no difficulty of interpretation because, unless the shares are preferred or dividends are
guaranted, s no basis for limitation of dividends is presented.'
A more difficult case is presented where the corporate instruments provide that certain shares are to be preferred in the payment
of dividends to a stipulated amount, but are silent as to the limitations, if any, of such shares to participate in dividend payments beyond the amount of this preference. Such a provision might be interpreted as limiting the preferred shareholders to the preferential
amount with respect to dividends, or interpreted as not so limiting
them. Most text writers and compilers of digests dismiss the problem with the statement that unless the corporate instruments provide
otherwise, preferred and unpreferred shareholders participate equally
in any distribution of profits, after the unpreferred have received a
dividend equal to the preference dividend.1" While the provisions of
the corporate instruments vary slightly in many cases, in a majority
of instances they merely specify that certain shares shall be entitled
to a specified preferential dividend." Thus courts, though in some
cases enabled to seize upon an obscure fact to avoid facing a direct
issue," are usually confronted with the question whether a specified
preference to dividends negatives any further rights in respect to
Continental Ins. Co. v. Minneapolis, etc. Ry. Co., supra note 3; Gordon's
Ex'rs v. Richmond F. & P. R. Co., 78 Va. 501 (1884); BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS (1927)
§ 161; see Berle, ParticipatingPreferred Stock (1926) 26
COL. L. Rv. 303.

' The term "corporate instruments" as here used means the articles of incorporation, by-laws, and share certificates.
' Dividends cannot be guaranteed by the corporation issuing the shares as
this would make the shareholders creditors of the corporation, Warren v.
Queen,

240

Pa. 154, 87 At. 595 (1913).

Nevertheless it is possible for some

"third person" to guarantee such dividends, e. g. a parent corporation could
guarantee dividends to shareholders of one of its subsidiary corporations.
' Unless the corporate instruments provide for some other disposition of
any surplus, this fund belongs to the shareholders. If a specified disposition
is stated, there is no question of construction. See, for example, the reference
to the shares of the Citizens Gas Co. of Indianapolis in Frey, op. cit. supra note
4, at 567, n. 12.
10 See i4 C. J. § 573; 7 R. C. L. 287; 1 CooK OIN CORPOATIONS (8th ed.
1923) § 269.

The provision of the articles of association in Murphy v. Richardson
Dry Goods Co., mtpra note I, is in substance similar to the provision in most
corporate instruments with respect to preferences.
In the recent English case of Collaroy Company, Ltd. v. Giffard, [1927]
I Ch. 144, the articles provided that "the preference shares shall confer the

right to a fixed cumulative preferential dividend . . . ".

The court held that

the use of the term "the right" instead of "a right' showed conclusively that
it was not intended that the preferred shares should have any right other than
the preference.

NOTES

participation. A review of the decided cases shows the existence of
two distinct and conflicting principles, both of which are sufficiently
broad to include any case where the provisions of the articles are silent
in respect to participation in surplus profits.
The first of these two opposing theories seems to have its origin
in the Pennsylvania case of Fidelity Trust Company v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company,"3 decided in 19o6, and in effect is that all
shares are equal except for the preference stated; that preferred
shareholders have all the ordinary incidents of shareholders together
with any preferences specifically given. By this view, which has been
steadfastly adhered to in Pennsylvania,14 but nowhere else except by
way of dictut, 15 preferred shareholders are not limited to the amount
of their preference as to dividends unless the corporate instruments in
express terms provide for a limitation.
Opposed to this so-called "Pennsylvania doctrine" are the only
two cases ", in which the problem has come up in this country other
"215 Pa. 6io, 64 Atl. 829 (i9o6).
'" The Fidelity case was followed by Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74
\tl. i6 (i9o9), which cited the Fidelity case as controlling. This view was
further strengthened in Pennsylvania by Sterling v. Watson, 241 Pa. 105, 88

Atl. 297 (913)

and Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366,

1o4

Atl.

614 (918)

where the court said, "The priority of preferred shareholders rests upon the
contract, and beyond its provisions they occupy no position in relation to the
corporation different from that of the holders of common stock."
'In fi re Espuela Land and Title Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 187, the issue was
distribution of surplus assets on dissolution, the court, however, used the
following language, "There is not any rule of law that shareholders having a
fixed preferential dividend take that only. It is quite open to a company to
distribute its revenue first in paying a fixed preferential dividend, then in paying
a dividend of a like amount to the ordinary shareholders, and then dividing
any surplus of any year rateably between the preference and ordinary shareholders." For a discussion supporting the Pennsylvania view see Christ, Right
of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the Distribution of Profits
(1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 731.
"In Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913)
it was held that shareholders who had been given a preference by a certificate of
incorporation which provided that preference shares should be "entitled to a
fixed yearly dividend of eight per cent. which is to be paid before any dividend
can be declared on the common stock", were not entitled to any interest in
accumulated net earnings beyond the eight per cent. preference. The court
reasoned that the preference implied a limitation. In Stone v. United States
Envelope Co., supra note 3, the court refused to allow shareholders who had
been given a preferential dividend to share with unpreferred shareholders in
distribution of surplus profits by way of a share dividend, on the ground that
the ordinary buyer of preferred shares buys with the understanding that the
maximum of his right to share in dividends is fixed by the fact of preference
and at the amount of preference. Said the court, "The creation of the preferred stock implies that the preferential rights of the [preferred] shareholders are given in lieu of and to the exclusion of the equality of participation
which should otherwise exist."
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than in Pennsylvania, and the one case 17 in which the problem has
been decided in England. These courts take the stand that the specified preference is given in lieu of the unlimited participation in dividend payments which would otherwise exist. By this view preferred
shareholders are limited to the amount of their preference as to
dividend payments even though the corporate instruments do not in
terms provide for such limitation. In England this view was taken
in spite of dictum in a previous case favoring the position taken by
the Pennsylvania courts.' 3
In none of the cases taking one of these two theories were any
factors considered other than the provisions of the corporate instruments. The Supreme Court of Virginia decided a case 11 approximating the same problem on equitable considerations. A thorough
analysis of the problem indicates that the terms of the corporate
instruments, while a very important factor, is only one of a number
of circumstances which ought to be weighed in determining the solution to this problem.
Such other factors are mentioned subsequently
20
in this note.

Distribution of Surphs Assets on Winding Up
In the English case of Wills v. United Lankat Plantations Company,21 Farwell, L. J., made the following observation: "To my mind
the considerations affecting capital and dividend are entirely different. The preference given to capital is in the winding up, and the
'In
Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., [I912] 2 Ch. 571, aff'd by
House of Lords [1914] A. C. ii, preferred shareholders were denied the right
of further participation. Lord Haldane, at 17 "Shares are not issued in the
abstract and priorities attached to them two flatu; and when you turn to the
terms on which the shares are issued you expect to find all the rights as regards
dividends specified in the terms of the issue."
S In re Espuela Land and Title Co., supra note 15.
" Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Branch & Co., 147 Va. 5op, 137
S. E. 62o (1917). In this case a surplus was to be distributed in the form of
voting shares and it was held that preferred shareholders were entitled to participate in share dividends beyond the amount of their preference even though
their right to dividends was limited to the preference given. The court reasoned
that an increase of shares in which the preferred shareholders did not participate would decrease the value of their rights upon dissolution, and that if the'
had (as in this case) equal voting power with the unpreferred shares, an increase in the number of shares would decrease the proportionate strength of the
preferred in management-control, unless they were given a proportionate
part of the shares so created. While the question raised in this case was primarily one of pre-emptive right, the court went much further than have even
the Pennsylvania Courts in holding that the preferred shareholders were entitled to participate even though expressly limited, when to enforce such limitation would cause an inequitable result. This case, while not strictly within
the scope of this note, advances an idea not to be overlooked: i.e. equitable
considerations as determining factors when the corporate instruments arc
clear as to preference and silent as to participation.
'Infra note 37.

"Supra note 17.

NOTES

preference claimed to be given to dividends here is in a going
concern." Commenting on this statement, Astbury, J., in Collaroy
Company v.Giffard,2 2 said, "Now it seems plain that different considerations may, and to some extent do, affect the respective questions
of capital preference and dividend preference. But whether the considerations affecting them are 'entirely different' is a question of some
difficulty."
In spite of these statements by the English courts to the effect
that the questions of preferred shareholders' rights to participate in
dividend payments and to participate in surplus assets on dissolution
should be governed by different considerations, no actual distinctions
have been pointed out by any of the decided cases.
As a general rule a preference with respect to dividends does
not affect such preferred shareholders' rights with respect to distribution of assets on dissolution; if there are surplus assets they participate pari passu with the unpreferred shareholders; 2-3 if the assets
are insufficient to repay all "capital" contributions, it has been held
that they get no preference in repayment." The case which presents
the difficult problem, as in distribution of surplus profits, is when a
definite preference with respect to repayment of "capital" contribution on dissolution is specified by the corporate instruments and nothing is said concerning a limitation with respect to participation in
surplus assets.
Only two cases concerning this precise problem have come up in
the United States, 2-5 both of which proceeded on the theory that
the provision of the corporate instruments that the preferred shareholders be "paid in full" on dissolution before the unpreferred be
paid anything impliedly negatived any further right in such preferred
shares to participate in surplus assets. These courts fail to make
any distinction between participation in profits while the company is
a going concern and participation in surplus assets on dissolution.2 1i
Whether this failure to distinguish between the two situations was
-Supra note 12.
'Birch v. Cropper, 14 App. Cas. 525 (889); see Continental Insurance
Company v. United States, 259 U. S.156, 181, 42 Sup. Ct. 540, 548; BALLANTInE
oN COROmRATIONs (1927) 534.
"Lloyd v. Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 75 N. J.Eq. 263, 72 AtI. j6
(19G9).

Murphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Co., supra note i, and Williams v. Renshaw, 220 App. Div. 30, 22o N. Y. Supp. 532 (1927). In this latter case the
certificate of incorporation provided that "preferred shares shall receive noncumulative dividends each year before any dividends shall be declared on the
common shares, and upon dissolution of the company and distribution of its
assets the preferred shares shall be paid in full at par before any amount shall
be paid on account of the common shares."
"While Murphy v.Richardson Dry Goods Co., supra note i,cited only
Williams v. Renshaw, supra note 25, in support of its stand, this latter case
seemed to rely strongly on Niles v. Ludlow Valve Co., supra note 16, a case
which concerned the distribution of surplus profits while the company was a
"going concern".
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lue to an unawareness of any difference, or to a conception that there
is no value in such a distinction is not evident. It will be interesting
to see how this problem will be treated in Pennsylvania if it arises.
It is difficult to see how the Pennsylvania courts could do 27
otherwise
than come to an opposite conclusion from these two cases.
The English courts have, with one exception," taken a different stand from the two American cases. The question has come up
four times. In In re Espuela Land & Title Company29 the memorandum of association provided for a cumulative preferential dividend
and a preferential right to be repaid the amount of "capital" contribution out of the assets of the company on dissolution. It was held
that this preference with respect to repayment on dissolution was in
no sense a limitation on the right to participate in surplus assets. A
contrary view, in accord with the two decisions in this country, was
taken by the court in the later case of In re National Telephone Company 20 where it was held that when the corporate instruments specify
a preference as to "capital" distribution, that prima facie impliedly
negatives the existence of a right to further participation. The two
subsequent English2 cases 21 in which the problem came up followed
the Espuela case.
Thus it appears that in England, while the only case which has
come up raising the question of dividend participation 3 was decided on the theory that a preference as to dividends raises an implied limitation with respect to participation in profits, the prevailing
'While it is not wise to prophesy in a branch of law depending almost
entirely on construction of written instruments, nevertheless the underlying
theory of the Pennsylvania cases with respect to preferred shareholders participation is that a preference is in no way a limitation, and that the preferred
shareholders have all the rights of an unpreferred shareholder with their preference attached thereto. To apply this theory in the one case and discard it in the
other would be a type of inconsistency foreign to the Pennsylvania appellate
courts.
' It re National Telephone Co., [19141 I Ch. 755.
'Supra note 15.

'Supra note 28.
'In

In re Fraser and Chalmers, [1919] 2 Ch. 114, the articles of associa-

tion provided for a fixed preferential dividend and a preference in repayment
of capital contribution on dissolution. The court held that this preference
acted only as a priority in the order of repayment, and did not limit the
preferred shareholders in participation as to surplus assets on dissolution. For
a comment on this case see (1927) 163 L. T. 253. In Anglo-French Music
Co. v. Nicoll, [i921] i Ch. 386 the memorandum was as follows: "The said

preference shares shall entitle the holders thereof respectively to a fixed cumulative dividend at the rate of ...

,

and to the repayment of capital before any

dividend is paid or capital is repaid to the holders of the said ordinary shares,
and to a further dividend calculated at the rate of etc......"

It was held

under this provision that the preference did not exhaust the right of the

preference shareholders.
'However, see Collaroy Company, Ltd. v. Giffard, supra note 12, where
Astbury, J., after stating that he believed his decision in In re Fraser and
Chalmers, supra note 31, was rightly decided, came to a result contrary to
that case.
'Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., supra note 17.
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view concerning participation in surplus assets on dissolution is that
a preference as to repayment of "capital"
contribution does not ex34
clude participation in surplus assets.
As it is generally impossible to determine from the corporate instruments whether the stipulated preference was actually intended
to add a new right to those already possessed by unpreferred shareholders, or to substitute a new right in lieu of the right to participation which would otherwise exist, 5 it is submitted that there are
only two methods by which this problem should be treated in order
to effect a satisfactory result: i. Take a definite stand, as the Pennsylvania courts have done, either that a preference is exhaustive or
that a preference is not exhaustive, and apply it in all cases where
there is doubt, both with respect to dividends and surplus assets;
this method, though arbitrary, would be convenient and definite in
its application. 2. Adopt the theory of the Virginia court in Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Branch & Company 36 and consider in each case a balancing of the equities 31 between the different
" It is difficult for the writer to see any difference in these two situations as a judicial problem. The question in both situations is primarily, though
not exclusively, one of construction of the corporate instruments. In each
situation there is a specified preference either for (i) a preference as to
dividends in the dividend situation, or (2) a preference as to return of capital

contribution on dissolution, and the question is whether this preference is a
limitation on further participation in respect to the subject of the preference.
A fixed return of capital to the shareholders in a winding up is just as much a

departure from the classical notion of a shareholder as a member of the cor-

poration and hence a peer of all other members, as is a provision for a fixed
dividend. If a provision for a dividend preference is regarded as prima facie
exhaustive as to that subject, there seems to be no reason why a provision as to
a preference as to capital upon dissolution should not be similarly exhaustive.
'Of course if an implication is clear one way or the other it is not
impossible to determine from the corporate instruments what the actual intent

was, see Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. and Equitable Life Assurance

Society v. Union Pacific R. Co., both supra note 5.
' Supra note i9.
' Perhaps- the most important consideration in this connection would be
the probable effect, of allowing or disallowing participation, upon the proportionate interests of different classes of shareholders in net earnings and net
assets; see supra note i9. Consideration would also have to be given to the

source of the fund to be distributed, e. g. suppose a class of shares are pre-

ferred as to capital but unpreferred as to dividends with nothing being said

with respect to a limitation in either case; if the net earnings of a number
of years have been accumulated with no dividend payments, a large surplus
will be available for distribution upon liquidation. To hold in such a case that

the preferred shareholders were limited to their preference would be palpably
unjust. Furthermore, consideration might be given to the circumstances sur-

rounding the creation of the preferred shares, e. g. whether they arose out of
a reorganization, or as the result of a desperate need of the corporation for more

"capital" at a time when money rates were abnormally high, or out of a desire
of a prosperous corporation for "capital" for expansion purposes at a time
when money rates were unusually low. These are factors of possible importance

in interpreting ambiguous corporate instruments in an attempt to determine
just what "rights" the "common" shareholders were conceding to the newly
created preferred shares.

474

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

classes of shareholders; this method would utilize a pragmatic test
less definite in its application.
J.C. B., Jr.

AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AT DESIGNATED PLACE AS CONSENT
TO JURISDICTION IN THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING '-A
contract

between A of London and B of New York containing an arbitration clause provides that all controversies arising under the contract
shall be arbitrated in London pursuant to the provisions of the English Arbitration Act.2 Differences arise and A serves notice' on B
in New York to join in the arbitration proceeding in London. B
disregards the notice and the arbitration proceeds.' Will the award
rendered in the ex parte arbitration or the judgment based thereon
pursuant to the local law ' be recognized and enforced in the courts
of the United States? " This, of course, will depend on whether the
agreement operates as consent to the English jurisdiction in the arbitrament. If it does, then the judgment will be enforced in our courts.
If it does not (B not otherwise subject to English Jurisdiction) the
'This paper adopts the "legalistic view", i. e., arbitration is a judicial
proceeding and therefore requires that the arbitration tribunal have jurisdiction
over the parties. The "realistic view" considers arbitration as a substitute for a
trial, a proceeding by the empowered "agents" of the parties. See Isaac, Two
Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 4o HARV. L. Ray. 929, ef. Sayre,
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 595, 600,
615.
2 52 & 53 VICr. § 49 (1889).

3"Notice" in arbitration statute not the same as process. Sturgis &
Burn Mfg. Co. v. Unit Construction Co., 207 Ill. App. 74 (1917) ; Mitsubishi
Goshi Kaishi v. Curtens Packing Co., 116 Wash. 630, 200 Pac. 327 (1921).
English rules of court allow service of process upon non-resident parties to
an arbitration agreement. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1927) 864, rule

8a, subhead c. Such service, however, would not confer jurisdiction over an
absent defendant so that the judgment would be recognized elsewhere.
Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (18o8). Cf. N. Y. Arbitration Law (392o)

§3, N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, ig3o) 85, requiring service "in the manner
provided by law for personal service of a summons".

See CoNFLICT OF LAWS

RESTATEMAENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 87 (2).

English Act allows arbitration to proceed with the arbitrator appointed
by the court. Supra note 2, § 5.
' An award may, by leave of the court or a judge, be enforced in the same
manner as a judgment or order to the same effect. Supra note 2, § 12. " . . . a
person who has obtained leave to enforce an award may subsequently bring

an action on the award, and in that manner obtain a final judgment." I HAISBURYS'

LAWS OF ENGLAND 473 (907)

§

990.

'The Federal rule is that "a judgment of a court of a foreign country is
conclusive as against the defendant if, and only if, the judgment of the court
of this country is conclusive under the law of the country in which the judgment
was rendered.

GooDR c,

CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927)

453.

A judgment ren-

dered by an English court would be accepted and enforced in American courts,
if the court which rendered it had jurisdiction. Ibid., 456.
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judgment will be unenforceable for want of jurisdiction over the
person of B. 7
Consent is a frequent and principal ground of jurisdiction over
absent persons not otherwise amenable to the court rendering the
judgment.$ The consent to serve as a basis of jurisdiction must of
course be actual. " One may subject himself to the jurisdiction of a
court by giving consent in advance, 10 a common illustration being
the "judgment note" "xauthorizing confession of judgment by an
attorney of any court of record. In Copin v. Adanson,12 a non-resident bought shares in a French Company, the articles of which provided that every shareholder must elect a domicile at Paris, in default of such election, he would be deemed to be domiciled at the office
of a certain state official for service of process.' 3 The foreign shareholder failed to elect a domicile; a judgment rendered against him
was sustained in England.14 The clause "All disputes relating to this
present agreement and to its fulfillment shall be submitted to the
Belgian jurisdiction" was held sufficient in England to support a
Belgian judgment rendered against the absentee defendant.'5
Does the agreement to arbitrate at a designated place, come
within the above consent principles and operate as conferring consent
to that jurisdiction?
In an Illinois case the agreement provided for arbitration under
an Illinois statute and that the award when made, may be filed in
the court of a certain county of that state, and judgment entered
thereon. On motion for judgment based on the award, the non-resi(lent company objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground
GOODRICH, op.

cit. supra note 6, at 459.

'Ibid., 140.
"RESTATEMENT,

supra note 3,§ 87 (a).

""Consent may be given with respect to a particular action either after
the action has been brought or before the action has been brought or it may
be given generally with respect to actions which may thereafter be brought".
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,§ 87 (b).
"Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387, 28 N. E. 353 (i89i). RESTATEMNIENT. supra
note 3,§ 87 (3).
2'L. R. 9 Ex.345 (1874).
"There was a provision of French law to the same effect, which the
English court held did not amount to consent and on this point would not
recognize the French jurisdiction over the defendant. The English courts
properly distinguish between an assent contained in the articles and an assent
required by general law. See Vallee v. Dumergue, 4 Ex. 290 (1849): Bank of
Australasia v. Nias, I6 Q. B. 717 (i851).
" Amphlett, B. "I apprehend that a man may contract with others that
his rights shall be determined . . . by a foreign tribunal, and thus by reason
of his contract would become bound by that tribunal's decision." Copin v.
.\damson, supra note 12, at 354.
"Feyreck v. Hubbard, 71 L. J.K. B. 509 (1902). A similar case is Jeannot
v. Fuerst, 25 T. L. R. 424 (19O9) ("the French Tribunals of Commerce alone
to have jurisdiction"). See dictmn of Mr. Justice Fry in Rousillon v. Rousillon,
49 L. J.Ch. 338, 344 (i88o).
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that it had not been served in Illinois.
objection, said :16

The court, overruling the

the defendant, by signing the agreement that the award
should be filed in the Circuit Court and judgment rendered
thereupon, definitely subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court and has authorized judgment to be entered against
a power of attorney authorit, as certainly as if it had signed
17
izing a confession of judgment".
In Seaton v. Kendall,' s in a proceeding for judgment on an
award of an arbitrator, it was contended that the agreement of submission must name the court which is to render judgment on the
award when made in order to confer jurisdiction. The court overruling the contention said:
"No reason is perceived why, in such an agreement, a particular court must be mentioned in which judgment may be rendered. The agreement is in this regard analogous to a power
of attorney authorizing a confession of judgment. From time
immemorial these have been in a general form, authorizing 'any
attorney of any court of record to appear in such court and confess judgment'. Yet it never has been doubted that this was
sufficiently certain to authorize any court of competent jurisdiction to enter the judgment, although neither the attorney nor the
court is specified by name." 19
The contract in a recent English case 20 contained an arbitration
clause providing that on failure of the parties to appoint arbitrators,
this should be done by a certain officer of the marine court of Christiana, Norway, the arbitrators to meet there. The parties failed to
appoint, whereupon the arbitrators were appointed by the court. An
award was rendered and judgment was recovered in England for the
amount of the award.
Gilbert v. Bernstein 21 is one of the most recent determinations
of the instant problem, and is substantially the case supposed at the
outset. The contention was there made that by the specific provision of this arbitration agreement, defendants had consented in
" Sturgis & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Unit Construction Co., supra note 3, at 8o.
'7Cf. Rasch & Co. v. Wulfert [i9o4] i K. B. 118, 122 (a proceeding to

enforce an arbitration award). Collins, M. R., said: "There is a distinction
• . . between an agreement to refer disputes and actual submission of a dispute to a particular arbitrator. A mere contract to refer disputes does not
seem to me to amount for this purpose to a submission in fact to the jurisdiction
of the arbitrator here, so as to give an English Court jurisdiction over him."
'61 Ill. App.
11Ibid.,
291.

291 (1895).

' Norske Co. v. London General Insurance Co. 43 T. L. R. 541 (1927).

212 2 9 N. Y. App. Div. 170 (193o) aff'g 135 Misc. 305, 237 N. Y. Supp. 171
(930) 78 U. OF PA. L. RRv. 9o5; Cf. (1930) 43 HARv. L. RFv. 653.

(929).

NOTES

advance to proceed with the arbitration in Great Britain, pursuant
to the provisions of the arbitration law of that country, and thus
bound themselves to abide by any award there made and obtained
in accordance with the procedure provided by the Arbitration Act of
1889. The court overruled the contention, attaching no significance
to the provision that the arbitration was to be had at London and
according to the arbitration law of Great Britain, and refused to
enforce the award on the ground that it was based neither upon service within the jurisdiction nor upon voluntary appearance in the
arbitration.
Whether the agreement to arbitrate at a designated place operates as consent is capable of two contrary determinations which necessarily lead to different results. Without for the moment deciding
the merits of either, a consideration of the practical results reached
under each may be helpful to a final valuation. If the agreement to
arbitrate at London operates as conferring consent to that jurisdiction, it is possible for an award and judgment to be rendered
against the party refusing to abide by the arbitration agreement in a
proceeding conducted in accordance with the English Act. " - Such
an award or judgment on general conflict of laws principles would
be enforced by the courts of the United States.
If Gilbert v. Bernstein is correct in that the agreement does not
amount to consent to the English jurisdiction, and B absents himself
from England and is not otherwise subject to that jurisdiction, it is
obvious that A can enforce his contract rights only where personal
jurisdiction over B can be obtained. -1 An attempt to enforce the
2 4English contract in New York presents a conflict of laws case,
and it becomes necessary to determine whether the enforceability of
"The English Act fully protects the parties' rights; § ig provides for reference to courts of questions of law. The Uniform Act also provides that questions of law may be reviewed by the courts. (So in the Ill., Pa., and Mass.
Acts but not the N. Y. Act.) See Sayre, op. cit. svora note I, at 613.
'At common law the only remedy available for failure to arbitrate was an
action for breach of the contract to arbitrate. STURGIS, CO-MMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS (930) 253. (For breach of agreements to arbitrate future
disputes there was apparently no action. STURGIS, at 82.) Practically this
right was of no value, since all that could be recovered was nominal damages.
TAYLOR, ARBITRATION AND

AWARDS

(1928)

18. To exercise this right the

action would have to be brought where personal service of the person refusing to
arbitrate could be obtained. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.714 (1878). Arbitration statutes have made arbitration more effective by providing for specific
performance in the case of local arbitration. N. Y. Arbitration Law (192o)
supra note 3, § 3. See Sturgis, Arbitration Under the New Pennsylvania Arbitration Statute (927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv.345. Where the party disregarding

the terms of the arbitration agreement brings a suit against the other party a
stay of proceedings will be granted. N. Y. Arbitration Act, supra note 3 § 5. If
foreign arbitration is provided for in the contract, although specific perform-

ance will not be granted the proceedings will be stayed. Danielson v. Entre
Rios Rys., 22 F. (2d) 326 (D. Md. 1927) ; Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco.
125 Misc. 728, 210 N. Y. Supp. IO (I925).
1 Goodrich, Public Policy i; the Law of Conflicts (1929) 36 W. Va. L. Rev.
I56.
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the arbitration provision is a matter of substance or of remedy.
2
it is substance then the law of the main contract is applicable.
it is remedy it is governed by the law of the forum. 2

.

If
If

"The forum determines what is matter of procedure and
what is matter of substance according to its own law." 21
The English courts 2 have treated the enforceability of arbitration
agreements as substantive, applying to them the same rules which
are applied to determine the validity of the main contract. It has
been suggested 21 that the English courts might not have taken this
view in the absence of the Arbitration Act establishing a local rule

favoring arbitration. 0

The American courts without distinguishing

between domestic cases and those involving foreign elements, have
treated such agreements as affecting only the remedy 31 and governed
by the law of the forum. 3" The result being that although by the
law governing the contract the arbitration provision is valid and enforceable, if at the forum arbitration is invalid as "ousting the jurisdiction of the court" or for some other reason,"2 the arbitration
4
provision is refused enforcement."
It seems then that the arbitration provision amounts to nothing
tinder Gilbert v. Bernstein, since it does not confer consent to the
jurisdiction designated, and the enforceability of the arbitration by
the vast weight of authority 35 is merely a matter of remedy which
may or may not be given effect to, depending on the law of the
SDICEy, op. cit. supra note 3, at 797.
'GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 157.
McClintock, Disthiguishing Substance and Procedure in the Con-flict of
Laws (930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 933, 938 citing RE-STATENM.NT, § 613.
'Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, [1894] A. C. 202. At 207 Lord
Herschell said, "That clause (arbitration) is as much a part of the contract
as any other clause of the contract." Spurrier v. La Cloche, [19O2] A. C. 446.
'Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflicts of Laws (0929) 38
YALE L. J. 617.
' In this country, however, statutory arbitration though said to announce
a "new public policy" has not affected the judicial attitude towards arbitration
sufficiently to consider it as substance rather than remedy. Berkovitz v. Arbib &
Houlberg, Inc., 230 N. Y. 261, 13o N. E. 288 (I92I).
'Heilman, op. cit. supra note 29, at 626 et seq.
'Based on a careful review of the decided cases it has been properly urged
that the correct view to be taken is that the "rules which are applied to
determine the validity or enforceability of the main agreement to which the
arbitration provisions relate should be applied to determine the validity
or enforceability of the arbitration provisions as well." Heilman, op. cit. sipra
note 29, at 617.
s'In U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed.
ioo6 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) Judge Hough lists the arguments advanced against
arbitration agreements.
' Shafer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. 172 N. E. 689
(1929) ; (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 302.
'Heilman, op. cit. supra note 29, at 626.

NOTES
forum.'0

Without considering the merits of arbitration, it may be

taken that the parties, by making a provision for arbitration at a
designated place, intended to accomplish something by that clause,
particularly where the contracting parties are located at considerable
distances from each other and disputes arising under the contract
are peculiarly adapted to settlement by arbitration. It may very well
he that the provision for arbitration at a named place is an important
commercial inducement for entering into the main contract.
It would undoubtedly be commercially desirable to take the view
that agreements to arbitrate at a designated place shall operate as consent to that jurisdiction. In the absence of some established rule of
law or existing policy to the contrary, commercial convenience should
prevail. If Gilbert v. Bernstein is correct, this desirable result may
still be reached by using very careful and specific language in the
arbitration clause conferring consent to the jurisdiction of the designated place.37
On general consent principles, since one may subject himself to
the jurisdiction of a court by consent in advance, it would seem that
an agreement to arbitrate at a designated place is such a consent. A
particularly strong case it would seem is presented where, in addition, the arbitration law of that jurisdiction is specifically mentioned
as governing.
S.J.R.

TAXATION
UNDER STATE

OF

SHARE

DIVIDENDS

AND

RIGHTS

TO

SUBSCRIBE

INCOME TAX AcTs-Since the Eisner and Miles cases,'

federal income tax procedure covering dividends of shares in the conapany declaring the dividend and based on profits accruing since the
federal act, and the procedure in the taxation of rights to subscribe to
new shares of capital stock in the company issuing the rights has
become definitely settled. Neither the dividend nor the right represents income in itself. Only when sold does any gain taxable under
the federal act arise; and then only when the selling price exceeds the
"Notwithstanding the decisions of the Court of Pennsylvania that the
contract as to arbitration was valid and enforceable in that state, judicial
comity does not require us to hold that such provision of a contract which is
contrary to a decided policy of our courts shall be enforced as between nonresidents of our jurisdiction in cases where the contract is executed and to be
performed without this state and denied enforcement when made and performed within our state." Hogan, J., in Meacham v. Jamestown R. R., 211 N. Y.
346, 351, 105 N. E. 653, 655 (1914).
' A similar result can be achieved by inserting a clause in the contract that
service of process may be made by mailing a summons to a designated address.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 87 (2).
'Eisner v. Macomber,
Deposit Co., 259

U.

252

S. 247, 42

U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (i919) ; Miles v. Safe

Sup. Ct. 483

(1921).
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original cost of the shares upon which the2dividend or right was based
after each has been properly apportioned.
Although much has been written regarding the soundness of these
two decisions, little attention has been paid to the equally interesting
and even more important side of the situation. Thirteen states now
have income tax laws, and three others I within the last year took
steps to amend their state constitutions so as to allow such taxation.
The problem as to whether share dividends and share rights represent
"income" or "capital", and so, the extent to which each is taxable,
assumes the same degree of importance here as under the federal act.
It is the purpose of this note to indicate the decisions under state
income tax laws on this point.
At the outset it is necessary to understand clearly two propositions. First, that although the Supreme Court of the United States
has held as above indicated that under the federal income tax act both
share dividends and rights to subscribe to new shares are not income
in themselves, no state is bound by the decision when faced with a similar problem under its own income tax act.4 Second, that while a state
may hold for purposes of distribution between life tenant and remainderman that share dividends and share rights are capital or income, it
is not necessary for it to arrive at the same conclusions for purposes
of income taxation.5 The states are therefore free for taxation purposes to reach conclusions which are the opposite of the federal decisions and which are the opposite of their own decisions regarding
distribution between life tenant and remainderman.
' Neither share dividend nor share right is taxed until sold and then on gain
only. The procedure for calculating the gain is as follows: Share Dividend-A
has ioo shares in X Co. purchased at $2,ooo.oo or $2o.oo per share. Receives io
shares as share dividend. Now has i1O shares for which he paid 2,000.00 or

$I&i8 per share. If he sells for more than $I8.18 per share he has realized
taxable gain. Share right-Under Miles Case, X received right to subscribe to
new shares at $I5O.OO. Had purchased shares on which rights were based for
$7IO.oo a share. Sold rights at $358.48 per right. The following was method
of calculating tax.-One old share cost $710.00. One new share could be bought
for $i5O.0o.

Two shares therefore cost him $86o.oo or

$43o.oo

a share. The

selling price of right was $358.48 and the purchaser had to pay $I50.00 tQ acquire
share. Therefore total cost to purchaser was $508.48. This minus bost of share
to X ($430.00) left $78.48 as taxable gain. For other problems see KLEIN, FEDF.RAL INCOME TAXATION (1929) § 26:9 (c) and 26:9 (g). For recent rulings see
Fathchild, Tax Liability Involved iim Sale of Stock Rights, 7 N. I. T. M. 95
(March, 1929).
' GA. LAWS (1929) Part I, Title III, No. 416, p. 143; KAN. LAws (1929) c.
281, p. 453; UTAH LAWS (1930) Joint Resolution No. 2, § 3, P. 22. See also
MicH. GEN. LAWS (1921) Joint Resolutions No. 2, p. 812.
Eisner v. Macomber, supra note i, at 217, 40 Sup. Ct. at 196; Lanning v.
Tax Comm'r., 247 Mass. 496, 498, 142 N. E. 829 (1924).
'Tax Comm'r. v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 533, 116 N. E. 9o4; 91o (1917);
State ex reL Dulaney v. Nygaard, 174 Wis. 597, 183 N. W. 884 (1921).

NOTES

Surprisingly little case authority is to be found. The income tax
acts of Virginia,6 Delaware,7 New Hampshire,8 and New York ' by
one device or another expressly exclude share dividends from taxation
as income from the mere fact of their receipt. Each of the statutes,
with the possible exception of New Hampshire,10 is sufficiently broad
to warrant taxation of any gain which might be made from the sale of
the share dividend. None of these statutes make any direct provision
for the taxation of share rights, and only in New York is there any
direct case authority. In People ex rel. Clark z. Gilchrist" the New
York Court of Appeals held that share dividends were not "income"
even in the hands of a beneficiary of a trust; and in People ex rel.
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lynch 12 an order of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court, taxing only the difference between the market
value of the share dividend and right when received and the amount
for which each was sold, was affirmed without opinion. In this particular group of states, therefore, no share dividend in itself can be
treated as income. Any gain from the sale of the dividend is taxable,
though only in New York is there direct case authority on this point.
The taxation of share rights, not directly provided for in the statutes,
remains indefinite, except in New York where like share dividends
they are taxable as income only when sold for a profit, the tax being
levied on the gain. These results differ only slightly from the methods
of calculation reached under the federal act. South Carolina 13by its
statute definitely adopts federal procedure so it also can be added to
this group which treats neither share dividend nor the rights as income.
The decisions in Massachusetts and Wisconsin are sufficiently
interesting to warrant separate handling. It was Chief justice Rugg
in the decision of the Putnam case who first voiced the view that share
dividends and share rights for purposes of income taxation could be
treated as income:

1

"Such rights (share rights) are themselves a species of tangible property. They come to the stockholder as a gratuity. They
are a new thing of value which he did not possess before. The
amount for which he sells them is a gain."
This decision was all the more interesting in view of the fact that there
were no direct provisions in the Massachusetts income tax law which
classified share dividends or rights as income. The case was reaffirmed
SVA. CODE ANN. (i930) App'x. Tax Code § 23.
'DEL. LAWS (1929) c. 8, §3, (a), (6) and §7, (6).
(No provision for taxing
8N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926) Vol. i, c. 65, § 3-I.

gain derived from sale of capital assets.)

c. 61, § 350.
N
N. H. Pus. LAWS, supra note 8.
243 N. Y. 173, 153 N. E. 39 (3926) (reversing People ex rel. Clark v.
Gilchrist, 21 N. Y. Supp. 679 (i925).
1-251 N. Y. 569, 168 N. E. 430 (1929).
" N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cum. Supp. 1926)

"S.

C.

CODE OF LAWS (1922)

No. 502, §§

i,

2,

p. 8g6.

"Tax Comm'r. v. Putnam, supre note 5, at 532, 116 N. E. at gio.
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in 1924, after the decision of the Eisner case, the Chief Justice again
saying:15
"Even in the Eisner case four out of nine justices believed
that a stock dividend could be taxed as income . ..
The decision of the Putnam case was rendered first. ....
It is adopted
without more discussion as the basis of this decision."
Under these views share dividends were taxed as income. 16 By statutory enactments in 192o and 1927 "Tthe legislature expressly excepted
share dividends from taxation as income with the result that they are
now taxable only when sold and apparently the federal method of
calculating the gain derived from the sale thereof is adopted. Though
changed by subsequent legislation, the decision in the Putnam case
could still be cited in support of the contention that share dividends
and rights were taxable as income, if the question arose in the next
group of states where they are not definitely excluded from income
classifications. The recent case of Allen v. Commissioner of Taxation,s
however, has cast considerable doubt on the authority of the Putnam
case which to that time had always been cited as opposed to the Eisner
case in holding that share dividends and rights for taxation purposes
were to be considered as income. The court's opinion, given again by
Chief Justice Rugg, held that share rights were taxable only under the
sections of the Massachusetts statute providing for the sale of capital
assets, and that the amount subject to taxation, therefore, was the difference between the market value of the right when received and the
amount for which it was sold. This conclusion was undoubtedly justified by the act of 1928,11 but the court when faced with the Putnam
case went on to say :20
"The main point for determination in the Putnam case .
was whether such gains were taxable at all as income. The
method of calculating the tax . . . was not before the court.
In these circumstances the statement that such rights 'came to the
stockholder as a gratuity. They are a new thing of value which
he did not possess before. The amount for which he sells them
is a gain' was used by way of argument to show that in their
nature gains arising from the sale of sucfi rights constituted
income."
Thus the Putnam case now stands as authority only for the proposition that if the share dividend or right is sold, the gain after deducting
the market value of the dividend or right is taxable as income, a result
' Lanning v.Tax Cornm'r., supra note 4, at 498, 142 N. E. at 83o.
"Tilton v. Tax Comm'r., 238 Mass. 596, 131 N. E. 219 (I921).
' MASS. GEN. LAws (i92i) Vol. i, c. 62, § i; MASS. GE,. LAws (1928)
C. 217, § I-c.
"172 N. E. 643 (1930).
MAss. GEN4. LAWS (1928) supra note 17.
Allen v.Tax Comm'r.,supra note i8, at 646.
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entirely in accord with the first group of states under consideration
and differing only in method of calculation from the federal view
which considers both as capital. This becomes important in the next
group of states. At any rate, in Massachusetts under existing acts
neither share dividends nor rights are taxable as income.
The situation in Wisconsin, now also belonging to the first group
of states, is interesting because of previous decisions. By the act of
1919 -1share dividends were expressly included within the definition
of taxable income; and under it they were taxed to the full value of
the dividend whether it was sold or not. 2 - The court, however, placed
great weight on the fact that they were expressly included in the -ncome tax act 23 which leaves doubt as to the value of the decisions in
that group of states where share dividends are neither included nor
excluded in the definitions of "income". In 1927 24 the Wisconsin
legislature provided that such share dividends should be taxable only
when sold, thus adopting the federal view and providing a method of
calculation seemingly in accord therewith. There are no decided cases
on the taxation of share rights. It would seem, however, that tinder
the 1927 act that they would be taxable only when sold as in Massachusetts.
Of the remaining states having income tax legislation Oklahoma, -' :
Missouri, " Oregon,2 7 and North Carolina 21 can be grouped together
for neither share dividends nor rights are expressly included or excluded in statutory classifications as income. There is no case authority. To tax either as income would necessitate a decision that the
dividend or right was "income" under the general provisions of the
acts. The court would be without authority in so holding since the
Visconsin cases are valuable only when there is a definite legislative
provision classing the dividend or right as income, and the \Iassachusetts decision in the Putwmi case has been virtually overruled as conclusive authority. While a contrary result might be reached, it seems
safe to suggest that this group, like the former one. would treat neither
the dividend nor the right as income and would reach virtually the
same decisions as the Eisner and Miles cases.

This leaves only Muississippi and North Dakota. In both, share
dividends are expressly included within the definition of dividends and
dividends in turn are made taxable as income. Subsequent provisions.
however, expressly exclude dividends from taxation when the corporation paying or issuing them is a domestic one, and reduce the income
taxation on dividends of foreign corporations proportionately to the
-'WIs. STAT. (1925) Vol. I, c. 71.02 (made retroactive as of 1911).
"State ex rel. Dulaney v. Nygaard, supra note 5; State ex rel. Van Dykc
v. Carry, 181 Wis. 564, i91 N. W. 546 (1923).
' State ex rel. Dulaney v. Nygaard, supra note 55, at 6o8, 183 N. W. at 888.
:!'WIS. STAT. (1927) c. 539, § 2 subsecs. 4, 5; subsec. 5 (d).
'OKLA. Coap. STAT. AN.\.
(Supp. 1921) Vol. 2, c. 84, Art. XX, § 13106.
"Mo. REv. STAT. (Minturn, Ann. Supp. 1927) c. tg, Art. XIX.
ORE. CODE Axx. (Off. ed. 1930) Vol. 3, 69:151o.
r N. C. CODE (Ann. 1927) 7880:116.
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income tax paid by such foreign corporations in the local state.2 9 This
would indicate that share dividends in certain foreign corporations
might be taxed as income.30 There are no decisions to that effect, nor
are there any cases on the taxation of share rights.
By way of summary it can be said that as far as share dividends
and rights are concerned under state income tax laws they have thus
far been treated in practically the same manner as under the federal
act, i. e. not as income. Of the thirteen states, six definitely exclude
share dividends from classification as income by legislative enactment.
One other reaches the same result by legislatively adopting the federal
provisions. Of the remaining six, four states would have to reach
such a decision with no precedent in other jurisdictions in order to
treat a share dividend as income. In the remaining two, only share
dividends in foreign corporations not subject to income taxation within
the state could possibly be taxed as income; and there is no case
authority even on this point. As far as share rights are concerned,
there are no express provisions in any of the state acts definitely classifying them as income, and all the decided cases treat them as taxable
solely on the gain when sold. It remains only to point out that here at
least is a possible field of taxation untouched by federal acts. No constitutional reasons prevent states from occupying it, yet the present
tendencies seem to point toward the adoption of the federal views.

T.B.D.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA OF GUILTY-Over-zealousness in obtaining convictions is a growing evil in the administration of
criminal law. 1 It becomes particularly important to point out such an
evil where the judiciary itself is a contributing cause. In recent years
a great number of cases have been reversed on the ground that the
trial court abused its discretion in not allowing a prisoner to withdraw a plea of guilty and to substitute for it a plea of not guilty.2
For the year 193o alone, seven reversals have been encountered where
it was held that withdrawal should have been allowed.3 The only
"Miss. AN-N. CODE (Hemingway, 1927)
N. D. ComP. LAWs ANN. (SupP. 1913) c.
a-18-(7).
'For discussion concerning "Deduction
ment of Dividends in Income Taxation, 33 J.

Vol. 2, §§5652, 5659, 5662-a, b;
34, §2346, a-I-(i2) and §2346,
Privileges" see Lutz, The TreatPOL. Ecox. 129 (1925).

'For example of such over-zealousness that do not come within the scope
of this note, see Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. R'v. 617 (The Third Degree);
Note

(1929)

2

So. CAl_

L. REv.

283 (Entrapment).

2 For a compilation of many of these cases see Notes (193o)

and (1922)

66 A. L. R. 628

2o A. L. R. 1445.

' United States v. Rossi, 39 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) ; Fowler v.
State, 153 S. E. 90 (Ga. i93o) ; People v. Carzoli, 340 Ill. 587, 373 N. E. 141
(1930) ; People v. Schraeburg, 340 Ill. 620, 173 N. E. 148 (1930) ; State v.
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reversal on this ground which the writer has found in the whole
history of the Pennsylvania courts, is a decision of the past year.4
Early writers speak of the care that the court should exercise
in receiving a plea of guilty,5 and two old cases reveal the extreme
caution with which the plea was accepted.8 Although these authorities speak only of a duty of precaution in receiving the plea, it was
not a far step to hold that a breach of this duty was such error that
the upper court would reverse the lower court and direct a change of
plea. A further extension resulted in directing a withdrawal for reasons other than the breach of duty of the trial court in accepting it.
The general rule laid down by the cases is that leave to withdraw a plea of guilty is at the discretion of the trial court but the exercise thereof is reviewable if an abuse of discretion is shown. 7 The
cases do not reveal any definite test used by the appellate courts in
the determination of whether there has been an abuse of discretion
Wassinger, 291 Pac. 743 (Kan. 193o); Kelley v. State, 288 Pac. iooI (Okl.
193o) ; Comm. v. Patch, 98 Pa. Super. 464 (193o) ; cf. Longenbaugh v. State.
288 Pac. 611 (Okl. 1930) (It was held there was an abuse of discretion but the
court only modified the sentence).
'Comm. v. Patch, supra note 3. The issue has never even arisen in the
supreme court. In the following lower courts this matter was discussed:Comm. v. Yuskis, ii Kulp lO4 (1902); Comm. v. Stephenson, 9 Kulp 561
(1899) ; Comm. v. Joyce, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 400 (1898) ; _Morningstar v. Comm.,
4 Walk. 346 (1884); Comm. v. Gerrity, 1 Lack. L. Rec. 430 (1878). In view
of what has happened in other jurisdictions, the writer predicts that within
short time many cases shall appear in the Pennsylvania reports.
r2
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, Chap. 31 § 2.
"And where a person
upon his arraignment actually confesses himself guilty, or inadvisedly discloses
the special manner of the fact, supposing that it doth not amount to felony,
where it doth, yet the judges, upon probable circumstances, that such confession
may proceed from fear, menace, or duress, or from weakness or ignorance,
may refuse to record such confession and suffer the party to plead not guilty."
2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN * 225. ". . . but it is usual for the court,
especially if it be out of clergy, to advise the party to plead and put himself
upon his trial, and not presently to record his confession, but to admit him to
plead."
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 329. "Upon a simple and plain confession,
the court hath nothing to do but to award judgment; but it is usually very
backward in receiving and recording such confession, out of tenderness to the
life of the subject; and will generally advise the prisoner to retract it and
plead to the indictment."
6Comm. v. Battis, i Mass. 94 (18o4).
The court told the prisoner he was
under no legal or moral obligation to plead guilty but he would not retract his
plea. He was sent back to prison to think it over. Later when he persisted
in his plea, the court examined the jailer, sheriff and justice as to the prisoner's
sanity and whether there were promises, persuasions or hopes of pardon if he
would plead guilty.
U. S. v. Dixon, I Cranch C. C. 414 (18o7).

After a warning of the

consequences, the prisoner was sent back to jail. Upon being ordered back
into court and again warned, he changed his mind and was allowed to plead not
guilty.
7
Estes v. State, 22 S. V. (2) 35 (Ark. 1929); Hubble v. State, 285
Pac. 153 (Wyo. 1930); Hopkins, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty (1889) II
CRIm. L. MAG. 479. But New Jersey appears to hold that the discretion is not
reviewable. Clark v. State, 57 N. J. L. 489, 31 At. 979 (1895).
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because in the many factual situations that arise, courts rarely, if
ever, point to one thing only as the cause for reversal." The most
that can be done is to point out the various factors that have been
considered and the weight that has been attached to them.
One of the main factors that appellate courts take into cognizance is the conduct of the trial judge in receiving the plea. Several states have statutes requiring the judge to explain the conse9
quences of the plea before accepting it. One state has gone so far
as to make it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment,
for a judge to receive the plea without giving the defendant a reasonable time to "talk with a friend and an attorney." 1o In addition
to the reversals for the failure to explain the consequences of the
plea,11 there are other cases remanded because the court failed to
2
Thus
inform the defendant of his rights before accepting his plea.
in one case,'" after a plea of guilty, the trial judge put the prisoner
on the witness stand and questioned him. The judge then accepted
the plea of guilty and told the prisoner that counsel would do him
no good. The upper court reversed the lower court with directions
that the plea be withdrawn because the court accepted the plea without informing the defendant of his right against self-incrimination
and of his right to counsel. The American Law Institute's Code of

Criminal Procedure,'4 although it imposes a duty of explanation, ex-

pressly says a failure to do so is not to affect the validity of the proceedings. This view is desirable because a failure to explain is often
unprejudicial error as, for example, where the prisoner is an old
offender.
In addition to passive misconduct, courts have been reversed for
active misconduct by inducing the prisoner to plead guilty. One case
See State v. Brown, 33 N. M. 98, IOI, 263 Pac. 502, 503 (1927).
CoLO. Comp. LAWS (1921) § 7095; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) 997;
S. D. REv. CODE (igig) §4741; TEx. RaV. CRIM. STAT. (i925) Grim. Proc.,

art. 501. The Illinois statute which is practically identical with that of Colorado,
reads, "In cases where the party pleads 'guilty', such plea shall not be entered
until the court shall have fully explained to the accused the consequences of
entering such plea; after which, if the party persist in pleading 'guilty', such
plea shall be received and recorded, . . . " In Michigan, the judge must
satisfy himself that the plea was freely made with full knowledge of the
nature of the accusation

MicH. PuB. Acts (927)

No. 175, ch. 8 § 35.

In New Jersey a plea of guilty is not to be received on an indictment for
murder. N. J. Comp. STAT. (i9io) Crimes § 107. In New York no conviction
is to be had upon a plea of guilty where the crime charged is punishable by
'death. N. Y. Clm. CoDE (Gilbert, 1929) Crim. Pro. §332.
"Missouri, Laws of 1923 § 3682a p. 159. A doubt as to its constitutionality
is expressed in State v. Sublett, 218 Mo. 1143, 4 S. W. (2) 463 (1928).
"Mullen v. State, 23o Pac. 285 (Okl. 1924) ; People v. Carzoli, supra note
3; Krolage v. People, 224 Ill. 456, 79 N. E. 57o (i9o6).
'People v. Kurant, 331 Ill. 47o, 163 N. E. 411 (928) ; People v. Lavendowski, 326 Ill. i73, 157 N. E. 193 (I927) ; Cassidy v. State, 168 N. E. i8
(Ind. i929) ; Polk v. State, 224 Pac. i94 (Okl. i924).
" Cassidy v. State, supra note 12.
"CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Am. L. Inst. i93o) § 224.
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was remanded where the judge threatened that the prisoner would
get a severe sentence if he did not plead guilty. 5 Other reversals reveal situations where heavy punishment was imposed after the judge
induced the plea by the promise of a light sentence. 16 Again, it has
been held that the judge erred because he practically compelled the
defendant to plead guilty in not giving his counsel a reasonable time
to prepare for trial.'" In a very recent case I- the judge refused to
allow the plea of guilty to several counts but said that the prisoner
had to plead guilty to the whole or none. He further said the prisoner should make up his mind quickly because the judge had to go
away to a meeting. Not only are judges often guilty of coercion
but also prosecuting attorneys 19 and arresting officers.' 0 A defendant's contention, however, that he was induced to plead guilty by his
attorney or friends is generally of no avail. 2" But when his plea is
induced by the threats of a mob, withdrawal is allowed."
A refusal to grant permission to change a voluntary plea is held
error where the accused did not understand the consequences of his
plea even though the court did not commit a breach of duty in failing
to give an explanation. Such a misunderstanding of the defendant
may arise from mental incapacity such as insanity, 23 illiteracy,2" infancy,25 or sickness. 2 6 Mistake may be the cause for misunderstanding as, for example, in pleading to the wrong indictment _7 or in believing that a certain mental element was not necessary for the crime. 2
Also along with other reasons courts have taken cognizance of
"O'hara v. People, 41 Mich. 623, 3 N. W. i6i (1879); cf People v.
Carzoli, supra note 3.
'0 Longenbaugh v. State, supra note 3; Morgan v. State, 33 Okl. Cr. 277,
243 Pac. 993 (1926).
" People v. McCrory, 41 Cal. 458 (1871);

People v. Schraeberg, supra

note 3.
People v. Carzoli, supra note 3.
" Reversals are generally granted for this reason. East v. State, 168 N. E.
28 (Ind. 1929) ; State v. Walters, 48 S. D. 322, 204 N. W. 17, (1925). But cf.
People v. Jankowski, 339 Ill. 558, 171 N. E. 68i (I93O).
' Fromcke v. State, 37 Oki. Cr. 421, 258 Pac. 927 (1927).
'Haase v. State, i7i N. E. 8II (Ind. 1930) ; McDonald v. State, II8 S.
628 (Miss. 1928).
' Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 S. 502 (1924) ; Sanders v. State, 85 Ind.
318 (1882) ; Kansas v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523 (1893); Little v. Comm., 142 Ky.
92, 133 S. W.

1149 (r11).

"People v. Scott, 59 Cal. 341 (I881).
'4State v. Manager, 149 La. 1083, 90 S. 412 (1922) ; State v. Maresca, 85
Conn. 509, 83 At. 635 (1912).
'State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412, 273 Pac. 490.

Comm. v. Patch, supra note 3.
' Davis v. State, 2o Ga. 674 (1856).
' Cook v. State, 138 Oki. 234, 281 P. 819 (1929) ; King v. Ingleson [1915]
i K. B. 512; Appeal of Baker, 7 Cr. App. Rep. 217 (I912) ; Note (0927) 9i
JUSTICE OF PEACE 382.

488

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

whether it was the first offense of the accused and whether he was rep-

resented by counsel.2 9
Appellate courts have also concerned themselves with the alleged
offense and its penalty in determining whether there has been an
abuse of discretion. The greater the severity of the punishment the
more are courts apt to allow withdrawal.30 If there is a possibility
that the facts as shown do not constitute the crime set out in the indictment, there is a tendency to reverse the trial court. 3 The probability of a defense is given some weight. 32 Thus one court 3 spoke
of the fact that in a previous trial on a plea of not guilty, the jury
had not been able to come to an agreement.
Aside from the factual difficulty in the determination of whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, complications are encountered
in the qualifications to the general rule of discretion. Many states 34
have statutes stating that the court may at any time before judgment,
permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn, and a plea of not guilty substituted. The courts of two states hold that their statutes give the
power of withdrawal to the prisoner as a matter of right-Georgia,3 5
and Iowa, 6 by judicial interpretation that
by an express provision,
"may" means "must".37 The American Law Institute's Code 38 prevents such interpretation by expressly providing that it is in the
a plea of guilty to be withdrawn at any
court's discretion to permit
39
time before sentence.
Although the Anerican Law Institute's Code 4 speaks of withdrawal only previous to sentence and hence implies that it is not to
be allowed after sentence, it is doubtful whether courts will uniformly
give it that effect because under statutes providing for withdrawal
before judgment it has been held that the same rule applies both before and after judgment. 4 1 Courts are in great variance as to when
East v. State, supra note 19; State v. Oberst,

127

Kan.

412,

273 Pac.

490 (1929).

"'Clay v. State, 82 Fla. 83, 89 S. 353 (921) ; State v. Oberst, supra note 29.
People v. Carzoli; Kelley v. State, both supra note 3.
' People v. Grant, 97 Cal. Ap. 422, 275 Pac. 838 (1929).
I State v. Schraeburg, supra note 3.
'ARiZ.
REV. CODE (1928) § 5016; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses
192) § 3o76; IDAHO CoMP. STAT. (1919) § 8881; N. D. Comp'. LAWS ANN.
(1913) § 10749; UTAH Co P. LAWS (1917) §8900.
'GA. PENAL CODE (1926) § 971.

'IOWA CODE (1927) § 13803.
' State v. Henderson, 197 Iowa 782, 198 N. W. 33 (2924). For the development of this Iowa exception see Note (2924) 10 IOWA L. BuL. 158.
' CODE OF CRImINAL PROCEDURE (Am. L. Inst. 293o) § 230.
' The New York statute also specifies that it is at the discretion of the
court. N. Y. CRimi. CODE (Gilbert, 1929) Crim. Proc. § 337.
'Supra note 38.
'People v. Schwarz, 202 Cal. 309, 257 Pac. 71 (1927); State v. Arnold,
39 Idaho 589, 229 Pac. 748 (924) ; State ex rel. Foot v. District Court, 81
Mont. 495, 263 Pac. 979 (1928) ; Morgan v. State, 33 Okl. Cr. 277,,243 Pac. 993
(1926) ; State v. Roberts, 136 Wash. 359, 24o Pac. 3 (1925) ; see McClain v.
State, 165 Ark. 48, 49, 262 S. W. 987, 988 (924) ; cf. People v. Kaiser, i5o
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the request to change a plea of guilty must be made. Cases reveal
the following time limits :-retirement of the jury which is to assess
punishment, 42 the entry of judgment, 43 pronouncement of sentence,"
service of sentence,43 court term." Still other cases apparently hold
that there is no time limit.4 7

It is interesting to observe that in several

cases where the lapse of time prevented the use of statutory procedure 48 in obtaining leave to change the plea, it has been held that
the old common law writ of coram tobis could be utilized. 49
The problem as to what limit, if any, should be set to the time
for withdrawal is most difficult. The arguments for a limitation are
that litigation must end, and that a passage of a long period of time
would handicap if not prevent the state from proving the crime set
out in the indictment. If there is to be any limit, that of the pronouncement of sentence seems desirable in that it will prevent the
0
prisoner from speculating on the clemency of a particular judge.5
A disadvantage of this limit, however, is that the plea may have
been induced by a promise of a light sentence or probation, and only
after sentence would the prisoner become aware of the trickery. An
especially good argument for allowing withdrawal at any time, lies
in the fact that the ordinary remedy of pardon 51 may be unavailable
App. D. 541, 135
of guilty did not
Contra: State v.
Iowa withdrawal

N. Y. Sup. 274 (1912) (statutory authority to withdraw plea
mean that the ourt could not withdraw plea of not guilty).
Van Klaveren, 208 Iowa 867, 226 N. W. 8I (1929). (But in
before judgment is in the prisoner's discretion).
' See Alexander v. State, 152 S.W. 436, 437 (Tex. 1912) (A right to withdraw).
' State v. Van Klaveren, supra note 41. (The pronouncement of sentence
was spoken of as judgment.)
" Comm. v. Phelan, 171 N. E. 53 (Mass. 1930) ; Reg. v. Sell, 9 Car. & P.
16 (1840) (Not authoritative today because at that time there could be no
appeal in England, see infra note 48).
'Hynes v. United States, 35 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
'Brown v. State, 92 Fla. 592, IOP S.627 (1926); Morgan v. State, 33
Oki. Cr. 277, 243 Pac. 993 (1926).
" Sanders v. State; Kansas v. Calhoun, both subra note 22; see People v.
Crooks, 326 Il1. 266, 272, 157 N. E. 218, 220 (1927).
The ordinary procedure is by an appeal or by a writ of error on a motion
to withdraw the plea or on a motion to vacate the judgment. Note (igoo) 14
-ARv. L. Rzv. 6o9. In England, on an appeal in a criminal case, a new trial
cannot be ordered. Lawson and Keedy, Crimial Procedure in England Ci9ig)
MAss. L. QUAI. 171, 215. But where a plea of guilty is entered by mistake
an appeal is allowed and the prisoner must plead again and the case proceeds
on that plea. Appeal of Baker, supra note 30.
"Rhodes v. State, 199 Ind. 182, i56 N. E. 389 (927) ; Nickels v. State;
Sanders v. State; Kansas v. Calhoun, all surPra note 22; see Note (1923) 37
HARM. L. REv. 744, 746. Contra: Comm. v. Phelan, supra note 44, Dusenberg v.
Rudolph, 30 S.W. (2) 94 (Mo. 1930).
'" That this speculation may not be so profitable is seen in Hynes v. United
States, supra note 45, where after a sentence of sixty days, withdrawal was
granted and upon pleading guilty again the prisoner was given a sentence of three

years.

" Irrespective of this remedy, it is contended that a judgment in a criminal
case for sufficient reason should be subject to attack at any time, see Williston,
Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 HARv. L. RFv. 647, 66o.

490

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

because of lack of sufficient proof of innocence even though there
is justification for allowing withdrawal.
Once the plea has been withdrawn, the question resolves itself
into the effect of the withdrawal. The majority of courts hold that
withdrawal has the same effect as if the plea had never been made
and hence, the fact of withdrawal is inadmissible as evidence in a
subsequent trial.5 2 The reasoning of these courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, is that withdrawal would be a
poor privilege if the plea of guilty were admissible as evidence. The
minority view treats it admissible as an ordinary confession.
Practically all the cases following the minority view, cite an old Kentucky
case. In that case, 54 however, the prisoner had changed his plea
without the permission of the court. Since the plea had never been
properly withdrawn, it is clear that it was proper to receive it in evidence.
A logical solution of this question requires an examination of
the nature of a plea of guilty. Such a plea appears to have an anomalous position in our law in view of the constitutional security of a
trial by jury since the very effect of such a plea is to do away with a
jury trial. 5 A close analysis shows that a plea of guilty is not what
is ordinarily meant by a plea in the sense that it creates an issue of
law or fact. Thus the early writers do not speak of a plea of guilty
but use the word "confession" in its place.56 Such a confession,
however, is not to be confused with the ordinary confession which is
merely evidence for the jury. A plea of guilty is a confession made
to the judge and hence there is no necessity for a jury to make a finding on any issue of fact. 7 If the judge accepts it, judgment can be
declared thereon, just as on a verdict by the jury. If the judge does
not rely, or an appellate court decides he should not have relied, on
this confession it seems that, a fortiori the jury should not be allowed
'Kerchwal v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 47 Sup. Ct. 582 (1926);
Jamail v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 5th, i93o) (A withdrawal
upon the express condition that it be told to the jury was held inadmissible);
State v. Hook, 174 Minn. 590, 219 N. W. 926 (1928) ; State v. Myers, 99 Mo.
I07, I2 S. W. 516 (5889) ; Heath v. State, 214 Pac. io9i (Okl. 1923) ; State v.
Jensen, 279 Pac. 5o6 (Utah 1929). In Georgia its admission is prohibited by
statute, supra note 35. As to the admission of a rejected offer to plead guilty
for a light sentence see (5929) 24 IzL. L. REv. 245. But evidence of a plea
of guilty in a preliminary hearing is generally admissible. Booker v. City of
Birmingham, 125 S. 603 (Ala. 1929); State v. Call, oo Me. 403, 61 At. 833
(i9o5); State v. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 82 Pac. 532 (1905); see State v.
Wassinger, supra note 3, at 744.
People v. Boyd, 67 Cal. Ap. 292, 227 Pac. 783 (924) ; State v. Carta,
go Conn. 79, 96 At]. 411 (1916) ; Comm. v. Ervine, 8 Danna 3o (Kty. 5839);
People v. Steinmetz, 24o N. Y. 411, 148 N. E. 597 (925).
"' Comm. v. Ervine, supra note 53.
'See Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Tury in Crininal Cases (1926)
25 MicH. L. REv. 695, 716.
' Supra note 5.

'In re Dawson, 20 Idaho 178, 117 Pac. 6g6 (1g91).
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to rely on it. It is true that it might be submitted to the jury with
the ordinary instructions that they are to consider it only as a piece
of evidence, but it cannot very well be doubted that a jury would consider it so weighty a piece of evidence that it would be almost conclusive.
In conclusion, it is repeated that trial judges should maintain
the ancient protection to a prisoner who pleads guilty. Aside from
pure logic or historical development, there is great social utility in
showing the prisoner that his rights have been zealously guarded,
since any other course would bring on an antagonistic attitude which
would be a hindrance in the reformation of the prisoner.
I.P.

